Abstract: Choices that are underdetermined by reason, such as choices arising from incommensurability among values, involve an element of arbitrariness, and arbitrary choices are commonly thought to be inimical to the rule of law. In this article, I suggest that we should distinguish between two different ideals of the rule of law, and that the arbitrariness of some judicial choices has different implications for these different ideals. One ideal of the rule of law can be understood as 'the rule of authority', and the other ideal can be understood as 'the rule of reason'. The latter ideal is opposed to decisions that lack reason, but not to arbitrary choices between undefeated reasons. The arbitrariness involved in choosing between undefeated reasons may be a deficit in one ideal of the rule of law (the rule of authority), but not a deficit in the other ideal (the rule of reason). Moreover, it is important to recognise that these are distinct ideals that can conflict, and not rival interpretations of a single ideal.
Introduction
The rule of law is usually contrasted with the rule of persons. Since the law can only rule through persons, this is usually taken to mean that the rule of law is opposed to the arbitrary power of persons. In Albert Venn Dicey's oft-cited formulation, the rule of law stands against 'the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint'. 1 In this article, I want to consider the question: is the arbitrariness entailed by rationally underdetermined decision-making contrary to the ideal of the rule of law? I will suggest that the rule of law contains many ideals, which are structured by two distinct, overarching ideals, and that these two ideals have different consequences for rationally underdetermined judicial choices, such as choices among incommensurable options. The rule of law is best understood as being opposed to decisions that are unconstrained by law, but not necessarily to decisions that are arbitrary.
The two ideals of the rule of law can be termed, for brevity, the rule of authority and the rule of reason. According to one ideal, which is the dominant one among modern legal theorists, the rule of law is presented in the image of authority, the image of existing legal rules constraining the decisions of officials, including judges. It entails that an official's decision should be able to be justified by the application of an existing, authoritative legal rule, without that 4 reason, and is therefore arbitrary, it might be thought that such a choice is contrary to the rule of law. But such a view rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of rationally underdetermined choices. These choices are compatible with the rule of reason, because, although arbitrary, they are also reasonable, that is, not contrary to reason. These choices are not a problem for the rule of reason, even though they may be a problem for the ideal of the rule of law in the sense of the rule of authority.
Before exploring these two ideals of the rule of law in more detail, some further preliminary clarifications are necessary. First, although I call these two distinct ideals, it is also important to understand that the rule of authority in a sense derives from the rule of reason. When it is legitimately called for, adherence to authority is a requirement of reason. In this way, the rule of reason will often require the rule of authority. But I call them two distinct ideals-or distinct aspects of the rule of law-to emphasise that they may require different things, pulling in opposite directions. That is to say, the requirement of adherence to legitimate authority may conflict with other requirements of reason.
To the extent that the two ideals conflict, it is a conflict within the rule of reason.
My claim, then, is that the rule of authority is a distinct ideal within the broader ideal of the rule of reason.
Secondly, there has been much academic debate on the question of how the rule of law is related to the concept of law, and whether the concept of law determines the rule of law or vice versa. Vagueness, uncertainty, and the equality, or rough equality, of the options all give rise to similar choices. Each of these is different, but they have one important thing in common: they all entail a range of reasonable decisions, with no uniquely correct answer within that range. The result is that an arbitrary choice has to be made. The choice will not necessarily be random (it might in fact be quite predictable how someone will decide), but it will be arbitrary in the anything we want: the ideal of liberty has to take some account of the ends that we should be at liberty to pursue. 21 In the case of evil or pointless laws, the value in following the law may be outweighed to such an extent that it seems as if it has no value at all. For in these cases what would the rule of law add? Is the thought that it gives evil laws some redeeming quality: that the law may be evil, but at least it is clearly evil?
The value in following antecedent rules is not best viewed as an end in itself. It has no intrinsic value. Following an authoritative rule is valuable only when it is an instance of legitimate authority. It is therefore dependent on the justification for the authoritative rule. My claim here is not that, when an authority is legitimate, there is value in following all of its directives. The legitimacy of the authority may be patchy, justifying only some of its directives.
But provided the authoritative directive is justified as an instance of legitimate authority, there is some value in having that rule that is not limited to the values that justify the directive's legitimate authority, such as the authority's expertise, democratic legitimacy, or its ability to coordinate action for the common good. 
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There is additional value to the extent that the directive lives up to the rule-oflaw requirements of clarity, generality, openness, prospectiveness, and so forth.
So these requirements have value, but only when we are justified in following the authoritative rule.
This ideal of the rule of law can therefore be stated as follows: if conduct ought to be guided by an authoritative legal rule, then that authoritative legal rule ought to be capable of guiding conduct. A law that is capable of guiding conduct enables the law's subjects to know where they stand and make decisions accordingly, and in that way may be said to promote liberty. Freedom under the law, in this sense, is the freedom that comes with the knowability of precise rules laid down in advance of the particular circumstances. 22 Yet by itself it is compatible with laws that (though clear, prospective, general, and so forth)
impose all-encompassing restrictions on its subjects lives. Freedom may be enhanced in other, more important ways: the freedom of not being subject to authority at all, or the freedom of being able to challenge authority.
That is why the ideal of the rule of law entails that if there ought to be governmental authority and the authority ought to be followed, it is better, from the point of view of promoting freedom, for governmental authority to adhere to the requirements of the rule of law. Thus the ideal of the rule of law is premised on the notion that there should be fidelity to the law, that the authoritative legal rather than merely the eighth desideratum of, the rule of law. 23 It is sometimes argued that the rule of law requires merely that judges and other officials follow the law, and that this duty arises even when the law's subjects are morally bound to follow the law. 24 As long as officials obey their duty of fidelity to the law, the rule of law is satisfied, so the argument goes, when subjects are capable of guiding their conduct, regardless of whether they choose to follow the law or are morally required to disobey it. On the other hand, it might be thought that, if the law's subjects are justified in refusing to follow the law, then officials cannot be justified in imposing the law on them. 25 In any case, whether it imposes more onerous requirements on officials than subjects, the core of this ideal of the rule of law-its focal meaning-includes both the guidance of conduct and the requirement of fidelity to the law. Waldron discusses may well reflect the various uses of the word 'arbitrary' in jurisprudence, but it seems to me that the second meaning-'unreasoned'-is the odd one out in this account of the rule of law. This may sound surprising, because we tend to think, rightly in my view, that an arbitrary decision is a decision that lacks reasoned justification and is a matter of choice, a decision that is sometimes said to be reached on the basis of one's 'will' rather than 'reason'.
Arbitrariness and the Rule of Authority
Yet the arbitrariness that the requirements of the rule of law are concerned to reduce is the arbitrariness that comes with, not unreasoned decisions, but decisions that lack the constraint and predictability of antecedent rules. For defenders of this ideal of the rule of law, unreasoned decisions are also arbitrary and a cause for concern, but as far as this ideal of the rule of law is concerned, 15 what matters is that there is the constraint of antecedent rules laid down by authority. There will of course be a judgment needed to create the rules, but that judgment should, on this account, be made by those in authority, not by those whose duty is to apply the authoritative rules.
Given that the application of rules often calls for moral judgment-either to interpret the rules, to fill in the gaps left by vagueness, or to decide whether or not to apply the rules-my account of this ideal of the rule of law may seem unrealistic. Vagueness in the law seems to make the rule of law in this sense an impossible ideal, and, as Timothy Endicott says, '[a]n impossible ideal seems romantic at best, and at worst absurd.' 27 Endicott has provided a more nuanced account of the rule of law, according to which vagueness and lack of constraint are not necessarily arbitrary in a way that is contrary to the rule of law.
According to Endicott, we need to distinguish between the different senses of arbitrariness and designate one sense of arbitrariness as pejorative and contrary to the rule of law. In making this argument, Endicott begins by outlining three ordinary senses of arbitrary government-lack of constraint, lack of consistency, and lack of certainty-and observes that arbitrary government in each of these three senses is often unavoidable. He then reaches the conclusion that there is not necessarily anything wrong with arbitrary government in these three senses, that they are not necessarily arbitrary in the ordinary, pejorative sense of the term.
Much of Endicott's argument here is compelling. Especially due to the inevitable vagueness in the law, lack of constraint is often an unavoidable feature 27 Timothy AO Endicott, 'The Impossibility of the Rule of Law' (1999) 19 OJLS 1, 4.
of adjudication. To the extent that we call this lack of constraint 'arbitrary', it is often relatively innocuous and, in any case, is necessary in the circumstances.
While the ideal of constraining decision-makers with authoritative rules may remain a valid ideal, that ideal loses some of its relevance when there is no rule governing the issue to be decided and hence there is no alternative but to, as it were, fill in the gaps where the rule runs out. But even in these circumstances, the unconstrained judicial choice remains a deficit for this ideal of the rule of law as the rule of authority. From the point of view of this ideal, it is a deficit that ought to be remedied through the creation of new authoritative rules to avoid this unconstrained choice in the future.
Endicott, however, believes that it is necessary to change our interpretation of the rule of law. To retain the ideal of the rule of law, he argues, we need a different, pejorative sense of the arbitrary government, which is necessarily opposed to the rule of law: 'Government is arbitrary', in Endicott's pejorative sense, 'if its actions depart from the reason of the law.' 28 The idea of 'the reason of the law' is puzzling. In explaining it, Endicott refers at one point to Raz's 'similar sense of arbitrariness', 29 which is Raz's claim that an exercise of power will be arbitrary in a way that departs from the rule of law 'only if it was done either with indifference to whether it will serve the purposes which alone can justify use of that power or with belief that it will not serve them'. 
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The important point here is that arbitrary decisions will be contrary to the rule of law if they 'call for', but lack, a justification other than the mere will of the decision-maker. Now, surely a decision will call for a justification if we think that there is a justification for a particular decision. If that is how we understand the rule of law, then a decision may be contrary to the rule of law when it is unjustified, when it is contrary to reason. But if that is how we understand the rule of law, then it is not the arbitrariness of a choice that is the problem, but the fact that it is contrary to reason. Are we really still talking about the same ideal of the rule of law? It seems to me that we are talking about a different ideal of the rule of law. 
The Rule of Reason
The claim that the rule of law is the rule of reason has a long pedigree. difference, however, between, on the one hand, the public being able to accept a justification and, on the other, the justification actually being accepted by most of the public. Justifications ought to be publicly acceptable-that is, made with an argument that everyone could, in principle, accept, even if people in fact disagree-but that is not to say that justifications should be made because they are publicly accepted. Justifications should appeal to consensus where possible, but it is less obvious that any possible consensus (assuming that one exists)
should 28 by other people. 57 But Endicott also writes that the need for resolution in judicial disputes is a special responsibility of judges, because 'the need for resolution never overrides the need for justice and the need for legality.' 58 This is far from clear, however, as Endicott himself acknowledges when he writes that 'it seems as if legality and justice do not matter' in cases in which there is 'no legal or moral reason to choose one resolution rather than another'. 59 Nonetheless, judges are often required by reason to resolve disputes between incommensurable options. 60 In doing so, they inevitably act arbitrarily, but not in a way that causes a problem for the rule of law in the sense of the rule of reason. 61 Only if the reasons that apply to the judge also call for an authoritative legal rule-even though no such rule may currently exist-will the arbitrary choice be contrary to the rule of law, in the sense of the rule of authority.
The compatibility between arbitrariness and the rule of reason suggests that, if two options really are incommensurable, then it may not be contrary to the rule of reason for the judge to choose between them by flipping a coin. As we shall see, there is a reason for judges to avoid flipping coins; however, perhaps 57 I think Scott Veitch exaggerates the extent to which judges should leave issues unresolved: see Veitch, Moral Conflict and Legal Reasoning (n 62) 169-71. 58 Endicott, 'The Impossibility of the Rule of Law' (n 33) 16. 59 ibid 16. 60 As Endicott says, this idea is well captured in Aristotle, Politics III.16: 'Where it seems that the law cannot draw a boundary, it would seem impossible for a human being to identify one. Yet the law trains officials for that very purpose, and appoints them to judge and to regulate that which leaves undetermined, as rightly as they can.' surprisingly, I do not think that the reason is because of an inherent injustice in flipping coins to decide legal disputes. It is not as easy as it might intuitively seem to find anything wrong with a judge, faced with a dispute between incommensurable options, using the quintessentially impartial device of flipping a coin. 62 Indeed, a coin flip or something similar would have the merit of explicitly acknowledging the lack of justification. 63 Endicott argues that the following is a conclusive reason against judges flipping coins in these situations:
'a need for judicial discipline … a discipline against corruption and prejudice and wilfulness'. 64 This is not entirely convincing, however, for surely flipping a coin would sometimes be quite a good way of preventing corruption, prejudice, and wilfulness. Yet there is a reason against flipping coins, which may well be conclusive. The risk is that a judge might adopt this approach even when the options are commensurable and the decision is determined by reason. Indeed, there have been instances in which judges, and juries, have done just that. 65 While our unease with judges flipping coins is most often explained by pointing to our dislike of decisions being made randomly or irrationally, 66 these contexts, the two ideals are harmonious, forming a consistent whole. But there is a danger in drawing the conclusion that, as Sir John Laws says, 'the rule of reasonableness is the condition of all legality':
[T]he voice that says public authority must obey the statute insists in the same breath that public authority has to bring a reasonable mind to bear upon its duties. There is in the end no distinction between these imperatives. To acknowledge the limits of one's power set by Parliament is to bring a reasonable mind to bear upon its exercise.
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Although we should acknowledge that the rule of authority is an ideal only to the extent that it is reasonable for the authority to rule, we should also acknowledge the distinctiveness of, and the possibility of conflict between, the two ideals. The rule of reason can sometimes require the rule of authority, but there are other requirements of reason and these can conflict with the requirement to follow authority. We should not be duped into thinking that the rule of reason can control the interpretation of authority so that the two ideals of the rule of law do not really conflict.
Once we understand that the two ideals are distinct, it is not difficult to see that a lack of conformity with the ideal of the rule of law as the rule of authority, though a matter for some regret, may be a good thing, all things Fuller rightly saw the problem of judicial empowerment as one of degree: his main concern-what he described as the first route to disaster for a system of law-was 'a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis'. 79 He understood that a 'utopia' of legality, in which his eight desiderata are perfectly satisfied, 'is not actually a useful target for guiding the impulse toward legality'.
80
This sensible, pluralistic approach to the rule of law is not something that depends on restricting the rule of law to the rule of authority. That said, I think it 76 Raz, The Authority of Law (n 4) 228. From the sound insight that the rule of law is more than the requirements necessary for the rule of authority, these theorists adopt an overly interpretative approach that seeks coherence among the different meanings of the rule of law.
The resulting unity, in their eyes, entails that the officials' duty of fidelity to law is almost absolute, with the law being interpreted in a way that, as far as possible, is in accordance with morality.
This unifying approach to the rule of law can be seen in an essay on the rule of law by Michael Oakeshott, in which he drew attention to two sides of the rule of law: the side that emphasises formal requirements of 'authenticity' ('lex') and the side that emphasises substantive requirements of 'rightness' ('jus').
Oakeshott conflated these two sides, arguing that they could be unified by the notion of rendering justice according to law (the 'jus of lex'). The substantive requirements of rightness, he says, are determined by arguing about the meaning of an authoritative legal rule in respect of its application in a particular case, not by considering what is in the public interest or what is right. 82 Oakeshott says that the jus of lex is not merely a matter of faithfulness to the formal character of law, but also invokes 'the negative and limited consideration that the prescriptions of the law should not conflict with a prevailing educated moral sensibility' capable of determining the kind of conditions that should be imposed by law. 83 But although jus and lex are to be distinguished, the rule of law on this account is about the rule of lex and about the jus inherent in lex, not about the rule of jus in the sense of the rule of reason that I set out in the previous section.
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One particularly striking feature of some unifying accounts of the rule of law is the suggestion that judges should not change the law. While most theorists who make this claim accept that judges often make political judgments when interpreting the law, they argue that, in doing so, judges do not (or at least should not) make decisions that are inconsistent with the law laid down in advance.
Nigel Simmonds makes a particularly strong version of this argument when he argues that judges cannot have a power to modify the law, because if they did, the 'rule-as-modified' would be 'applied in the very case that gave rise to the modification, so that all such cases would have to be regarded as the most serious departures from the rule of law.' 85 When judges conform to the rule of 37 reason and apply standards not found in the authoritative sources, the unifying account seeks to hold judges to the same requirements as those associated with the ideal of the rule of authority and freedom under the law. 'If legality is related to the idea of freedom as independence,' Allan writes, 'we must suppose that the content of common law rules is, in principle, knowable in advance of action that might infringe them: we should not have to await retrospective judicial pronouncement.' 86 For Allan, the requirement of knowability can be satisfied because, although a court's justification for its decision may at times be politically contentious, the rule of reason can be based on shared criteria of justice.
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There is much at stake in disputes over the meaning of the rule of law.
What is at stake is nothing less-and quite a lot more-than the questions of 
